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Abstract
Conventional random number generators provide the speed but not
necessarily the high quality output streams needed for large-scale stochas-
tic simulations. Cryptographically-based generators, on the other hand,
provide superior quality output but are often deemed too slow to be prac-
tical for use in large simulations. We combine these two approaches to
construct a family of hybrid generators that permit users to choose the
desired tradeoff between quality and speed for a given application. We
demonstrate the effectiveness, performance, and practicality of this ap-
proach using a standard battery of tests, which show that high quality
streams of random numbers can be obtained at a cost comparable to that
of fast conventional generators.
Keywords: random number generator, pseudorandom, stochastic simulation,
one-way function, cryptographic transform
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1 Random Number Generators
Large stochastic simulations, such as those typically run on highly parallel su-
percomputers, consume vast quantities of random numbers. Designers and users
of random number generators face a dilemma: how to achieve the speed nec-
essary to make the computation feasible while avoiding any hint of correlation
or bias that would invalidate the results. Conventional random number genera-
tors [1, 7, 9], typically based on simple arithmetic recurrences, may possess the
requisite speed, but they carry a significant risk of failure due to the questionable
quality of the resulting streams, especially when produced in great abundance,
thereby inviting more opportunity for detectable patterns to emerge [6, 13, 18].
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This should not be surprising: according to Kolmogorov’s definition [8], a truly
random stream is incompressible (i.e., it has no shorter description than simply
enumerating its members); a generator algorithm provides a succinct encoding
of the stream it produces, which therefore cannot be truly random. Such de-
terministically generated (hence reproducible) streams are more properly called
pseudorandom, but nevertheless a well-designed generator may still produce
streams that appear random in that they may pass various statistical tests of
randomness [11, 15].
1.1 Cryptographically-Based Generators
An alternative view of randomness is taken in cryptography, in which random
number generators are ubiquitously employed to generate random keys, sig-
natures, and the like [3]. In security applications, quality is paramount and
performance secondary, as an easily compromised cryptographic protocol would
be useless regardless of its efficiency. Here, a stream is considered random if it
is computationally indistinguishable from the desired true distribution, that is,
detecting any difference would require a prohibitive amount of computation [4].
Many cryptographic protocols are based on one-way functions, that is, functions
that are easy to compute but difficult to invert (i.e, to find an input value that
yields a given output value). In principle, a one-way function can be used to
construct a “perfect” random number generator, in that resistance to inversion
ensures computational indistinguishability of the resulting stream [4, 5]. Alas,
there are two difficulties with this putative panacea: the existence of one-way
functions is an open theoretical question (closely related to the famously un-
resolved P = NP? problem) [12], and the known candidates believed to be
one-way functions (e.g., factoring products of large primes) are relatively ex-
pensive to evaluate, making the resulting generator slow and thus seemingly
unsuitable for large stochastic simulations [10]. The first of these issues does
not seem to be a problem in practice unless efficient algorithms are unexpect-
edly discovered for these currently intractable inversion problems, or if it turns
out that P = NP , in which case true one-way functions do not exist. The speed
of cryptographically-based generators is an important practical issue, however,
which we address next.
Practical cryptographic transforms, such as block ciphers and hash functions,
are based on algorithms that are carefully designed and extensively tested to
ensure their resistance to inversion. These algorithms employ basic operations
(e.g., substitutions, permutations) that obscure any structure in the input by
dissipating it over the output. This process is usually repeated multiple (of-
ten many) times (called “rounds”) to ensure sufficient diffusion, which is the
main reason such transforms are relatively slow. Nevertheless, their superior
ability to produce high quality random output is crucial in security applica-
tions, and it could also make stochastic simulations more robust if the speed
of cryptographically-based generators could be made competitive with conven-
tional generators. Recently, cryptographically-based generators have been used
for a few stochastic simulations and computer graphics applications. Crypto-
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graphic transforms employed have included AES and Threefish [19], MD5 [21],
and TEA [22]. To make the cryptographically-based generators competitive in
speed, the corresponding cryptographic transforms were weakened by reducing
the number of rounds significantly, and in some cases by making other sim-
plifications to the algorithms as well. The resulting generators are no longer
sufficiently secure for cryptographic applications, but still produce streams of
sufficient quality for stochastic simulations, as demonstrated by passing stan-
dard statistical test batteries. Here we will pursue the same objective but with
a different approach, using a full-strength cryptographic transform but combin-
ing the output of the resulting generator with that of a conventional generator,
which will allow us explicit, quantitative control of the tradeoff between quality
and speed.
2 Combined Cryptographic/LCG Generator
To create a fast generator with sufficient randomness, we combine a crypto-
graphically-based generator with a fast conventional generator. Because of their
speed, simplicity, and widespread use, we chose a linear congruential generator
(LCG) for the conventional generator (which will also serve to illustrate that
even a relatively low-quality generator can be rehabilitated using our technique),
but any type of conventional generator should also work. Because cryptographic
transforms are relatively slow, we amortize the cost of computing random bits
by reusing them in the combined generator. We define two parameters relevant
to combining the two generators:
• size: the number of cryptographically-based 32-bit random numbers (cryp-
tographic values) stored at a given time;
• repetition: the number of times each cryptographic value is used before
being discarded.
Motivated by its well-known bias-reducing property [2], we use bitwise exclu-
sive-or (XOR) to combine cryptographic values with LCG-based 32-bit random
numbers (LCG values) in an alternating fashion. Let k be the value of size and
n the value of repetition. The first k LCG values are XORed uniquely with
the k cryptographic values. Specifically, the first LCG value is XORed with
the first cryptographic value, the second LCG value is XORed with the second
cryptographic value, and so on, until the kth LCG value is XORed with the
kth cryptographic value. The next k LCG values are XORed with the same k
cryptographic values in a similar fashion. This process is repeated until each
cryptographic value has been used to XOR n LCG values. Then the k cryp-
tographic values are discarded and k new cryptographic values are produced.
This procedure is repeated until the generator stream is terminated. Figure 1
illustrates the effects of various values of the size and repetition parameters in
the combined generator for some small examples.
3
Figure 1: Examples showing effects of size and repetition parameters in com-
bined generator.
2.1 Practical Implementation
We chose the Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-256 [17] as the basis for the cryp-
tographic generator due to its exceptional resistance to inversion and its wide
acceptance in the cryptographic community. Because each call to SHA-256
produces 256 random bits of output, eight 32-bit cryptographic values are pro-
duced by each call. Due to the cryptographic strength of SHA-256, we use
i = 1, 2, 3, . . . to seed the generator (as in [19]), with no noticeable correlation
in the resulting output.
We selected three popular LCGs to combine with SHA-256:
• Super-Duper [14]: xn = xn−1 ∗ 69069 + 1 (mod 232),
• glibc rand: xn = xn−1 ∗ 1103515245 + 12345 (mod 232),
• Borland C++ rand: xn = xn−1 ∗ 22695477 + 1 (mod 232).
Because the low-order bits in power-of-two modulus LCGs have much shorter
periods than the high-order bits [16], we call each LCG twice and concatenate
the 16 highest-order bits of each iteration to obtain a more reliable 32-bit random
number.
2.2 Parallel Generators
One of the key advantages of using a cryptographic transform as part of our
combined generator is ease of parallelization. SHA-256 has an exceptionally
large (264 − 1)-bit seed space [17], which allows for production of 8 ∗ 2264−1/n
independent streams of n 32-bit random numbers. For example, the SHA-
256 generator can easily produce 21000000 independent streams of 21000000 32-
bit random values if desired. To parallelize the SHA-256 generator, simply
concatenate the stream number with a counter i = 1, 2, 3, . . . for each stream.
Because each stream will have a unique seed, the cryptographic strength of
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SHA-256 ensures independence of streams. To parallelize the LCG, one can
choose any of several suitable ways as outlined by Srinivasan, Mascagni, and
Ceperley [20], such as introducing a lag, choosing prime addends, or choosing
prime moduli.
3 Test Results
To test our combined generators, we used the test batteries in TestU01 [11],
a collection of popular random number generators and tests to measure their
effectiveness. TestU01 includes three predefined test batteries for random bit
sequences: SmallCrush, Crush, and BigCrush. We used SmallCrush for prelimi-
nary testing, but it is insufficiently stringent to detect anything other than gross
defects in generators. Crush is a considerably more strenuous battery of tests,
applying 96 statistical tests and producing 144 test statistics and p-values while
consuming approximately 235 random numbers. Crush was applied to all gen-
erators in this paper to assess their approximate quality and suggest candidates
for further testing. BigCrush was then used to test the most promising gener-
ators more rigorously. BigCrush applies 106 statistical tests and produces 160
test statistics and p-values while consuming approximately 238 random num-
bers. All programs were written in C, compiled with gcc, and run on a 2.8 GHz
Intel Xeon X5560 processor.
Figures 2 and 3 show results of BigCrush tests for each of the three com-
bined generators for various values of the size and repetition parameters. The
column for size=0 gives the number of test failures (out of 160) using only the
corresponding LCG, for which repetition is irrelevant. For a given nonzero value
of size, increasing repetition (reuse of cryptographic values) degrades reliabil-
ity (larger numbers of test failures), as expected. Varying the size parameter
reveals a more complex relationship, in which increasing size from 1 improves
reliability up to an optimal value, then may degrade reliability beyond that
point. An explanation for this behavior is given in the discussion below. To
avoid running expensive BigCrush tests for cases that were certain to have a
relatively large number of failures (and therefore not yield a useful generator),
the figures merely indicate (by orange and red shading) repetition factors for
which the number of failures is 5 or more (out of 160), except that full results are
given for the optimal value of size for each generator (blue shading). The three
generators produced generally similar results, although the SHA-256/glibc rand
combined generator achieves maximum reliability for size=32, whereas size=16
is optimal for the other two combined generators.
Timing results given in Table 1 show that increasing repetition increases
the speed of the combined generator, i.e., the more times the cryptographic
values are reused, the faster the generator produces random bits. In Table 1, we
see that the SHA-256 generator takes an average of 1.56 seconds to produce 223
random values, whereas each of the LCGs alone takes an average of 0.19 seconds
to produce the same number of values. The combined generator that uses
each cryptographic value only once (repetition=1) slows performance due to the
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Figure 2: BigCrush failures (out of 160 total) for combined SHA-256/Super-
Duper generator.
overhead of creating both cryptographic values and LCG values. However, the
speed is improved by producing fewer cryptographic values and increasing the
number of times they are used in the combined generator stream. As repetition
increases, speed initially increases substantially, but improvement levels off for
repetition > 64. The combined generators with repetition ≥ 256 are nearly
identical in speed to the LCG generator. Table 1 gives timings only for the
optimal value of size for each combined generator, but additional tests showed
that for a given fixed repetition, timing results remain nearly identical as the
size parameter varies.
3.1 Discussion
Reusing SHA-256 values in the combined generators results in less costly but
less reliable streams of random numbers. Table 1 illustrates the relationship
between repetition and both speed and failure rate for each of the combined
generators. For example, the combined SHA-256/Super-Duper generator with
repetition=16 has a more than five-fold increase in speed compared to the SHA-
256 generator alone, while still passing all of the statistical tests. At repeti-
tion=256, the combined generator is essentially identical in speed to the LCG
generator, while failing only 3/160 tests compared to failing 109/160 tests using
Figure 3: BigCrush failures (out of 160 total) for combined SHA-256/glibc rand
generator (left) and combined SHA-256/Borland C++ rand generator (right).
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Table 1: Execution times in seconds (averaged over 20 trials) for producing 223
32-bit random numbers for three combined generators, each combining SHA-
256 with indicated LCG. Failures indicates number of test statistics failed out
of 160 using BigCrush.
LCG Super-Duper glibc rand Borland C++ rand
size 16 32 16
repetition time failures time failures time failures
SHA 1.56 0 1.56 0 1.56 0
1 1.70 0 1.70 0 1.70 0
2 0.95 0 0.95 0 0.94 0
4 0.57 0 0.57 0 0.57 0
8 0.38 0 0.38 1 0.38 0
16 0.28 0 0.28 2 0.28 1
32 0.24 1 0.24 3 0.24 3
64 0.21 1 0.21 3 0.21 3
128 0.20 2 0.20 3 0.20 4
256 0.19 3 0.19 3 0.19 4
512 0.19 3 0.19 3 0.19 4
1024 0.19 3 0.19 3 0.19 4
2048 0.19 3 0.19 3 0.19 4
4096 0.19 3 0.19 3 0.19 4
8192 0.19 3 0.19 3 0.19 4
16384 0.19 5 0.19 5 0.19 6
LCG 0.19 109 0.19 104 0.19 88
Super-Duper alone.
Varying size produces slightly less intuitive results. It is well known that
LCGs exhibit a high degree of serial correlation [6, 13, 18]. With a relatively
small size parameter, we are able to eliminate correlation between successive
LCG values. Unfortunately, correlation remains in each substream that shares
a common cryptographic-value buffer. For example, if we have a high-repetition
generator with size=2, there will be significant correlation between every second
value in the sequence. This is the same type of correlation that lagged LCGs
suffer from. Because this correlation stems from the fact that each LCG value
is determined uniquely by the previous value (given that the other parameters
are fixed), we call this type of correlation local correlation (indicated by orange
shading in Figures 2–3).
Increasing size improves generator quality, but only up to a point. Clearly,
as size increases, local correlation in the resulting stream decreases. But as
size becomes large, another type of correlation in the LCG stream becomes
visible between long, disjoint sequences of values. This correlation is a result
of the simple recursive nature of the LCG, leading to an inherent structure
in the stream regardless of the actual values produced [16]. We call this type
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of correlation global correlation due to its ubiquitous nature (indicated by red
shading in Figures 2–3).
Thus, the size parameter should be chosen sufficiently large to hide local
correlation, but not so large as to reveal global correlation in the LCG stream.
Our results suggest that combined generators with size between 16 and 32 are
most suitable in this regard (blue shading in Figures 2–3).
4 Recommendations
Several factors should be considered when choosing a combined random number
generator. We will start with the easiest parameter to choose: size. Clearly, it
is preferable to choose the size that minimizes failure rate. If several size values
produce similarly reliable generators, then the smallest acceptable size should
be chosen to minimize the amount of state required, which in turn minimizes the
amount of memory required. This is particularly important for highly-parallel
applications, for which careful use of memory is often critical. If minimizing
state is absolutely essential, a suboptimal size can be chosen at some cost in
reliability.
To choose the best repetition factor, users must carefully consider their
needs. Consider, for example, the SHA-256/Super-Duper combined generator.
In Table 1, we see that the repetition ≤ 16 generators provide the highest relia-
bility, while the repetition ≥ 256 generators provide maximum speed. Choosing
the repetition parameter may be easy for users who are either very conservative
(≤ 16) or care mainly about speed (≥ 256), but other users may prefer a com-
promise between speed and reliability. For example, many users may find the
size=128 generator suitable for their needs, as it passes all but 2/160 BigCrush
tests, and thus is vastly superior in quality to standard library LCGs, yet runs
only 3.2% slower than the pure LCG. Because it is easy to vary the repetition
parameter, users can experiment and choose the value that best meets their
needs in a given situation, for example, “quick and dirty” preliminary explo-
ration versus more exacting final simulation runs.
When choosing a cryptographic transform as the basis for the cryptographic
generator, we recommend SHA-256 for reasons already given, although other
cryptographic functions may be equally suitable, and quite possibly faster, which
might give somewhat different tradeoffs than we observed in our tests. For
relatively reliable and easily parallelizable LCGs, we recommend the SPRNG
library [16]. These generators have been extensively studied and are suitable for
highly parallel implementation, and based on our results they should perform
well as part of a size=16 or size=32 combined generator.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the use of a full-strength cryptographic trans-
form in a combined generator can dramatically improve the quality of streams
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produced by a conventional linear congruential generator for stochastic simula-
tions, with no significant sacrifice in speed. Moreover, our approach provides
explicit, quantitative control of the tradeoff between speed and reliability, so
that users can easily select the choice that best meets their needs in a particular
situation. Future work along this line could include consideration of other cryp-
tographic transforms besides SHA-256, as well as other types of conventional
generators besides LCGs, such as lagged Fibonacci generators, for the respec-
tive components of a combined generator. Either or both of these options may
produce somewhat different tradeoffs between speed and reliability from those
we observed in our experiments.
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